Abstract-Modern grid codes attempt to unify the existing standards developed by various national and international organizations, implemented from different utilities and generator manufacturers. This evolution of new grid code practices is associated with increasing interoperability of different power systems across borders. This paper compares existing regional network codes for requirements for grid connection applicable to all generators regarding their compliance with the newly formulated code by the European network of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E). Furthermore, it studies the impact of the unified ENSTO-E codes on the fault-ride-through capability of nuclear power plants (NPP) under extended operating voltage and frequency ranges. The analysis is performed on the typical 1000MW NPP under different voltage and frequency critical ranges and shows that extending the voltage fluctuation below 0.9 pu could affect NPP reliability.
INTRODUCTION
New Grid codes attempt to unify the existing standards developed by different (national and international) organizations and implemented by different utilities and manufacturers. Revisions of grid codes are implemented to simply and reinforce the cooperation and coordination of different network operators across borders [1] . The work presented here has been initiated by the NUGENIA+ INTEGRID Project, with a focus on the efficient integration of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the energy mix. In fact, new grid codes are developed, requiring increased flexibility from existing power plants including NPPs, with an aim to support greater integration of Renewable Energy Sources (RES), particularly the handling of the electrical power provided by the wind farms of the Nord-sea into the European electrical network. Such revisions are mainly needed in response to the increasing pressure from regulators, manufacturers and network operators to add new requirements and consider all different emerging types of generators within more standardized recommendations [2] .
To progress towards this increased standardization the network code for requirements for grid connection applicable to all generators [1] , which is usually referred to as "Grid Code", is implemented. Many regional standards and codes mandate the conditions under which power plants should remain connected during a fault in the transmission network [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] and historically have been used to determine the thermal stressing and operating design criteria of the synchronous machines [10] [11] [12] .
Current trends to reduce costs, through standard plant designs and manufacturing processes, have forced regulators towards unified international standards [2, 14] . This harmonisation of standards has resulted in many generating plants adjusting their frequency and voltage ride through capabilities. NPPs as one type of the generators connected to electrical networks should also follow the grid code requirements to ensure that the necessary coordination and security for both the power network and power plant is achieved. NPPs, however, are susceptible to frequency and voltage excursions and usually have limited automatic response to frequency decay and voltage support [15] . Any changes in grid codes as a result of the increasing network utilization and connection of renewable energy sources can have an adverse effect on NPP operation and maintenance costs, particularly for older plants.
Currently, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) has established a unified grid code for the EU region that modifies the requirements of smaller regional codes. This unified code includes changes related to network security and the fault ride through (FRT) requirements [1, 3] , as well as operational security and how to comply with transmission operator requests on maintaining the generator voltage and frequency targeted values for the specified periods [1, 13] . This paper investigates the impact of the recently formulated ENTSO-E grid code [1] on NPPs in response to their FRT capability. The analysis is based on a typical 1000MW NPP and aims to highlight the conditions that might result in prolonged voltage and frequency oscillations, and instability. The next section is an overview of NPP problems related to frequency and voltage fluctuations. Section III discusses the diversity of existing Grid Codes against the unified ENTSO-E ones. Section IV presents the FRT analysis of a standard 1000MW NPP and section V underlines the key conclusions of the paper.
This work is a part of the INTEGRID project that was supported by the FP7 NUGENIA+, project No: 604965.
II. PROBLEMS WITH NPP INTERCONNECTION ON TRANSMISSION GRID
Any power grid, with large load and generating capacity fluctuations, is challenged to operate within as small as possible frequency and voltage excursions. To minimize these excursions, the network operator requires additional devices, such as automatic load shedding and generation control, reactive power management and voltage control, instrumentation and communication systems, to effectively coordinate generating stations and optimize load dispatch. Furthermore, it requires fast fault detection and fault clearing capability to resolve network disturbances. These mechanisms are of increasing importance particularly within current and future power systems where high network utilization and renewable energy integration are expected. Power systems, stressed with renewables and distributed generation, frequently challenge these control mechanisms leading to increased occurrences of random frequency and voltage disturbances [16] [17] [18] , with impact on NPP reliability [19, 20] .
A. Frequency Fluctuations
NPPs are designed to operate more efficiently as constant invariable base load stations. When frequency fluctuations occur, the disturbance within the NPP is initiated by the governor movement resulting in changing the turbine's steam flow. The dynamic characteristics of different types of reactors and generators, along with the response of their control systems, determine the magnitude and impact of such frequency fluctuations. Furthermore, flow variations of the primary water coolant loop appear due to water pump speed disturbances which are also determined by the characteristics of the NPP [21] . In a grid with a limited control capability, such disturbances are likely to be frequent, and in the long run, may reduce the life of key components and pumps in NPP, and increase maintenance and interruption costs [22] .
B. Voltage Fluctuations
NPP operators prefer to maintain voltage levels very close to nominal value while restricting the operation outside of the nominal range to short durations. Excessive overvoltage operation can damage the equipment while operating below the nominal voltage range could trip auxiliaries with increasing risk of NPP tripping [23] . Unfavorable voltage conditions can also affect start-up times of large in-plant motors with corresponding delays in NPP start-up times [22] .
C. Faults and Transients
Short circuits on the transmission side can lead to severe voltage drops and mismatching between power generation and load. This can result in the sudden acceleration of the turbogenerator, within the NPPs, producing large torsional stresses in the turbine's shaft and heating the stator windings. Clearing the faults rapidly within the transmission system is very critical. Any inadequacy in protection relay coordination and operation time of the circuit breakers may trip the NPP due to initial tripping of the auxiliary water pump motors, followed by loss of synchronization and turbine shaft stresses [19, 22] .
III. DIVERSITY OF GRID CODES FOR NPP
To avoid excessive damage of large turbo-generators in NPPs and maintain network integrity, grid codes are utilized by network and plant operators to dictate the frequency and voltage excursions within which NPPs should operate. There is a number of grid codes in Europe [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] and USA [3] with diverse requirements for NPPs. To address this multiregulation environment the European network of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E) and the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) [14] have developed a new grid code for the EU area.
A. Fault Ride Through Requirements
Different requirements for turbo-generators, according to the country or region where the generator is connected, have made the standard products specification increasingly challenging. Figure 1 shows the voltage ride through requirements, set by different regulators on a fault at the point of common coupling (PCC) for the generators connected at 110 kV and above against the unified ENTSO-E grid code minimum and maximum delays and voltages. Harmonized ENTSO-E code requires lower voltage dips and longer time periods, at least for some regions. Consequently, the generators have to maintain a connection to the grid for longer with larger voltage sags under the new ENTSO-E grid code. Only the English, NGC-30%, and the Spanish, REE, grid codes are more severe than the ENTSO-E requirements ( Figure 1 ). Thus, by adopting ENTSO-E as required by ACER the existing generators might require additional control systems to maintain stability.
B. Frequency and Voltage Requirements
The grid codes also specify the frequency and voltage deviations from nominal values as well as the durations these deviations could last, during which generating units should be kept connected to the network and supply power. In Figure 2 these frequency deviations and durations are specified for different regions. The NPP generators have to be connected for frequency variation of 49 Hz -51 Hz with unlimited time periods. This is the same for most grid codes. The frequency range operation of NPPs outside of this range is dependent on the region and network operator. Once again the grid code of Great Britain is the most demanding code with the widest frequency range and longer durations for NPPs maintaining a connection to the network. Figure 3 shows the minimum times a NPP turbo-generator shall be capable of operating at voltage deviations from the nominal network voltage. IEC and IEEE require turbogenerators to be designed for continuous operation over ± 5% of rated voltage for an unlimited duration. ENTSO-E unified code specifies wider voltage ranges and for longer periods (Figure 3 ). 
IV. FAULT RIDE THROUGH ANALYSIS OF NPP UNDER ENTSO-E CODES

A. NPP network data and configuration
The FRT analysis of NPP is examined under the most severe three-phase symmetric fault at PCC. A pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear plant is used, as it is popular for producing electricity due to its increased reliability [24, 25] . PWR typically consists of five major components: the reactor, the steam generator, the steam turbine, the steam condenser, and the synchronous generator [22] . These components are linked via three main levels of water/steam coolant loops circulated via large pump motors. These pumps are the main loads in the NPP while additional motors are used for other ancillary services. The first loop uses a set of reactor coolant pumps (RCP) to transfer thermal energy from the reactor to the steam generator. The second loop transfers water, by using the main feedwater pump (MFWP), into the steam generator and steam turbine which is then condensed back to water. The third "condenser" loop uses the main condenser pump (MPC) to circulate water from the environment to the water condenser. The size of NPP determines the number of parallel loops implemented at each level. These main loads used in this study are shown in Table I .
The NPP network is modelled using PowerFactory 14. The exact layout of the plant network configuration is shown in Figure 4 . Although the network does not refer to a specific NPP, it represents a good approximation of the main loads and components within the NPP [26, 27] required for this initial study. The two standby transformers in Figure 4 are disconnected in normal operation following standard practice.
B. NPP Turbo-generator and control data
The parameters required for the transient modelling of the 1000MW, 27 kV turbo-generator are obtained from [28] , while the excitation system is modelled following the IEEE guidelines [29] . Over-excitation (OEL) and under-excitation (UEL) limiters are used with an AC1A alternator-rectifier type excitation controller, a lead-lag IEEEST type power system stabilizer, and an IEEEG1 with four steam-stages and crosscompound modelling speed-governor controller. All their modeled variables shown in Table II [29, 30] .
C. FRT performance of NPP for different faults at CCP
The analysis of the dynamic stability considers the most severe three-phase fault scenario at the transmission network side since this reduces the voltage of all phases. The fault is set to occur at 1 second at 400 kV bus, and the simulations compute the outputs for a 10 second period. Four different fault scenarios (FSc-1 to FSc-4) are considered varying in clearing times and severity (i.e., retained voltages), based on the grid code requirements:  FSc-1: A 150 ms bolted fault at the 400 kV bus.  FSc-2: A 250 ms fault with 25% retained voltage.  FSc-3: A 700 ms fault with 50% retained voltage.  FSc-4: A 1500 ms fault with 85% retained voltage. 
Two studies are performed with these four scenarios. One considers nominal voltage and frequency operation prior to the fault, and the other considers the presence of frequency and voltage fluctuations at the extreme new ENTSO-E grid codes ranges prior to the fault. Only the impact at the turbo generator terminals is recorded assuming the generator delivers the maximum rated power (1000MW).
1) Nominal operation prior to fault studies
The four simulation scenario outputs of the frequency response are shown in Figure 5 . The blue lines indicate the voltage requirements specified by ENTSO-E. The fluctuation in frequency does not exceed the specified range in the code, with the FSc-1 reaching the maximum value of 51.39 Hz at the time of fault occurrence. In all the examined scenarios the generator maintained stability.
The voltage fluctuations after the faults are shown in Figure 6 . All four responses are within the grid code requirements. The voltage at the terminals of the generator is restored within the ±10% limits of its nominal value in less than 0.5 sec after fault clearance. This time is defined as the settling time, which is the time required to reach 90% of the steady-state value after clearing the fault. The only case during which the voltage is not recovered within the settling time is under FSc-3. This scenario seems to stress the PCC point with the highest voltage oscillations, which results in voltage falling temporarily outside the code's margins.
2) ENTSO-E code extreme operation prior to fault studies
While the new grid codes have been developed to provide the network operator with increased flexibility, this may have a significant impact on the NPPs concerning their stability, voltage and frequency regulation. To capture the impact of the NPPs at extreme but feasible operating conditions on their currently implemented control schemes the plant performance across the full range of ENSO-E code conditions is considered. Therefore, the NPP operation at maximum and minimum voltage and frequency boundaries, prior to the fault, is studied. These initial pre-fault conditions are shown in Table III, while Table IV summarizes The over-frequency pre-fault operation also weakens the system response during the fault. Only FSc-4 results in a postfault response that complies with the grid codes while FSc-2 and FSc-3 violate the FRT constraints. FSc-3 also exceeds the 1.5 Hz frequency maximum limit. The most severe scenario is FSc-1 which resulted in instability of the generator at 0.3 s after the fault occurred. On the contrary, the under-frequency pre-fault operation does not pose any instability problems; however, it causes larger oscillations when compared to the studies that consider nominal pre-fault operation conditions. These oscillations, although they are damped, violate the FRT requirements set by the ENTSO-E grid code.
When combining both voltage and frequency fluctuations before the fault, as expected to be the operating condition under the ENSTO-E grid code, it can be observed that the voltage and frequency swing after the faults increase in severity. The most severe case is the under-voltage combined with under-frequency pre-fault conditions. Under these conditions, the only stable fault is the one described by FSc-4, as all other faults led to generator instability.
All these disturbances induce transients in the NPP which may increase the temperature and pressure in various subsystems in the plant. Furthermore, these are expected to be more frequent in networks with increased penetration of renewable (wind and solar) sources that could lead to increased voltages or rapid power flow fluctuations. The ENTSO-E codes' attempt to increase network operation flexibility could induce increased stresses on the NPPs. The long-term cumulative effect of these stresses may result in premature failure of some plant components (e.g., pumps, joints, switching devices, protection relays, cables and transformers) and/or increased maintenance costs. NPPs could have a very reliable operation for their expected 30 years lifetime [22] . When transient power fluctuations are induced due to voltage and frequency variations, additional mitigating actions should be considered to improve NPP cooling and maintain plant reliability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
New unified ENTSO-E grid code is proposed for the European regulators in an attempt to maintain consistency among the different interconnected regions. The code also aims to provide networks with increased flexibility during faults. This standardization majorly helps the coordination of interconnected regions in Europe to respond to contingency events quickly avoiding any additional plant tripping. However, it also increases the stress to NPPs as they are more likely to scram due to the voltage and frequency fluctuations than from the failure of the incoming power line [15] . The analysis of a generic 1000MW NPP indicated that when under-voltages dominate the pre-fault conditions could lead to instability. The (unified) ENTSO-E code has further extended the under-voltage operation level resulting in increased stresses of existing NPPs. This inevitably requires additional measures to be taken by the NPP operators to ensure that overstressing and degradation of their plants is minimized to a level that does not affect the plant's life and reliability.
Further analysis is required to identify the impact of dominant factors within the turbo-generator control systems to increase NPP stability and mitigate the impact of power fluctuations on plant's reliability. Additional studies should include the impact of pumps size and other ancillary loads on NPP dynamic performance since in some cases the generator terminals could experience higher voltages than the network.
